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KEEPING THE “I” IN THE IDEA: 
A RESPONSE TO A PROPOSAL TO ABANDON 
INDIVIDUALIZATION IN SPECIAL EDUCATION IN FAVOR OF 
RULE-BASED DELIVERY MODELS 
 
Thomas A. Mayes, J.D.* 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Since its enactment1 people have viewed the Individu-
als with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”)2 with a mixture 
of promise and skepticism.3 Many commentators have offered 
bold and aggressive proposals for reform.4 Professor Karen 
Syma Czapanskiy offered one such proposal in her 2016 arti-
cle, Kids and Rules: Challenging Individualization in Special 
Education.5 Professor Czapanskiy proposes that schools, ra-
ther than developing individualized plans for each child who 
requires special education, be permitted to offer rule-based 
 
* Mr. Mayes (B.A., Baylor University; J.D., The University of Iowa College of Law; M.Ed., 
Lehigh University) is an attorney with the Iowa Department of Education. Mr. Mayes is a Cer-
tified Child Welfare Law Specialist. Affiliation for identification purposes only. Views herein 
are solely his.1. See Pub. L. 94–142, 89 Stat. 773 (1975). 
 2.  See 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. 
 3.  President Gerald Ford offered the following observation in signing the statute: “Un-
fortunately, this bill promises more than the Federal Government can deliver, and its good in-
tentions could be thwarted by the many unwise provisions it contains.” Miriam Kurtzig Freed-
man, Special Education: Its Ethical Dilemmas, Entitlement Status, and Suggested Systemic 
Reforms, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 2 & n.9 (2012) (quoting Gerald R. Ford, Statement on Signing 
the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, 1975 Pub. Papers 1935). 
 4.  For two examples, see Freedman, supra note 3, and Perry A. Zirkel, Over-Due Pro-
cess Revisions for the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 55 MONT. L. REV. 403 
(1994). 
 5.  See Karen Syma Czapanskiy, Kids and Rules: Challenging Individualization in Spe-
cial Education, 45 J.L. & EDUC. 1 (2016). 
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plans for children with similar educational needs, such rules 
being developed through the notice and comment process of 
the administrative rulemaking process.6 She posits that a rule-
based approach to special education programming is “more 
likely to be evidence-based, responsive to certain parental and 
public concerns about special education, freer of discrimina-
tion and more faithful to democratic values.”7 
Along with others who have reviewed this proposal,8 
I urge educators and policy makers to exercise caution 
when considering it. The proposal appears to be motivated 
by legitimate critiques of the present IDEA system. How-
ever, abandoning individualization as Professor Czapanskiy 
proposes, regardless of the reasons, may create mischief. 
The purpose of this paper is to identify such areas of po-
tential mischief and to explain why, if implemented, Pro-
fessor Czapanskiy’s proposal would lead to the very prob-
lems she critiques.  
 
II. THE PROPOSAL 
 
Professor Czapanskiy’s policy proposal, at least at first, is 
creative and audacious. In proposing to replace individualization 
with group-based rules, she writes: 
 
Under my proposal, school systems should be 
required to adopt, through a public process, 
rules applicable to the numerous situations in 
 
 6.  See id. at 2–3. 
 7.  Id. at 4. 
 8.  See, e.g., David B. Rubin, Standardized IEPs: One Size Fits None?, 46 J.L. & EDUC. 
227 (2017); Jennifer Rosen Valverde, An Indefensible Idea: Eliminating Individualization From 
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act, 46 J.L. & EDUC. 235 (2017); Mitchell L. Yell, 
Individualization Is Special Education: A Response to Czapanskiy, 46 J.L & EDUC. 245 (2017); 
Perry A. Zirkel, Are Categorical IEPs Categorically Unacceptable?, 46 J.L. & EDUC. 219 
(2017). 
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which multiple children fit the same profile and 
can benefit from the same educational program. 
Thereafter, whenever a student is found, after 
careful assessment, to meet the profile, the 
school system will use the plan that was adopted 
through the public process. Parents will have 
an opportunity, along with other members of 
the community, to comment on the proposed 
rule and to seek to have it changed. They will 
not have the opportunity, however, to require 
the school system to use a different plan for 
their child if their child meets the profile identi-
fied in the rule.9 
 
Yet in the very next paragraph, her bold proposal is scaled 
back: 
 
To be clear, my proposal is not intended for 
situations where a student’s situation is unusual. 
In those cases, the IEP should proceed as it does 
today. Nor am I proposing that students should 
be assumed to share a common profile in the 
absence of careful individualized assessment and 
investigation. If the student’s assessment has 
not been done properly, parents would remain 
free to contest its conclusions. My proposal is 
limited to those situations where the student’s 
profile is shared by many others and where the 
school, after adequate investigation into educa-
 
 9.  Czapanskiy, supra note 5, at 2–3 (citations omitted). Professor Czapanskiy offered 
an earlier version of this proposal in 2014.  See Zirkel, supra note 8, at 219 & n.4 (citing Karen 
Syma Czapanskiy, Special Kids, Special Parents, Special Education, 47 U. MICH.  J.L. REFORM 733 
(2014). 
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tional research and an adequate opportunity for 
public scrutiny, has adopted a rule about what 
plan will be used for all students with the same 
profile.10 
 
She concludes that her rule-based system will be limited to 
“appropriate”11 cases.  Her rule-based system, even when lim-
ited to “appropriate” cases, poses several conceptual and appli-
cation difficulties. 
 
 
A.A Rule-Based Approach Will Present Major Implementation 
Questions and Outcome Concerns. 
 
The rule’s qualifier “appropriate,” however, provides 
the first barrier to capturing ease in application that Professor 
Czapanskiy seeks. Special education litigation defines “appro-
priate” with difficulty12; indeed, defining the term at all is akin 
to eating ice cream with chop sticks. “Appropriate” is fact-
specific, illusive, and slippery. If a family can no longer chal-
lenge the appropriateness of the education provided under a 
rule-based system, it takes no great feat of lawyering to recast 
the claim as inappropriate application of a rule.13 Consider a 
 
 10.  Czapanskiy, supra note 5, at 3. 
 11.  Id. at 5. 
 12.  See Endrew F. v. Douglas Cnty. Sch. Dist. RE-1, 137 S. Ct. 988, 1001 (2017) (“We 
will not attempt to elaborate on what ‘appropriate’ progress will look like from case to case.”); 
Bd. of Educ. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176, 202 (1982) (“The determination of when handicapped 
children are receiving sufficient educational benefits to satisfy the requirements of the Act pre-
sents a more difficult problem. *** We do not attempt today to establish any one test for deter-
mining the adequacy of educational benefits conferred upon all children covered by the Act.”); 
Freedman, supra note 3, at 12; Dixie Snow Heufner, Judicial Review of the Special Educational 
Requirements Under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act: Where Have We Been 
and Where Should We Be Going?, 14 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 483 (1991); Perry A. Zirkel, 
Have the Amendments to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act Razed Rowley and 
Raised the Substantive Standard for “Free Appropriate Public Education”?, 28 J. NAT’L. ASS’N 
ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 397 (2008). 
 13.  See Zirkel, supra note 8, at 223–24 (“For example, consider the predictable blitz of 
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parent who would have argued that her child with a specific 
learning disability did not receive appropriate instruction 
based on her child’s unique needs.  Under Czapanskiy’s rule-
base system, the parent could easily recast her complaint to al-
lege that, because of her child’s unique needs, it would not be 
appropriate to apply the rule to her child.  In the second case, 
the parent raises what is functionally the same claim and relies 
on the same evidence.  Between the two cases, there is no net 
benefit in ease of application: both cases wind up in litigation. 
Further exploration of Professor Czapanskiy’s proposal 
reveals a variety of additional difficulties for the application of 
such a rule-based framework. F o r  e x a m p l e ,  the general 
rule would be that the rule applies to a child if the child “fits” 
the rule’s “profile.”14 But how close does the child have to be 
to the profile to meet it?15  How much commonality with 
peers is required? Assume, for purposes of this article, a rule 
for providing services to children with autism has three ele-
ments. If a profile in the hypothetical rule has three elements, 
is meeting two of three a good enough “fit”? Within each of 
these three elements, how close to meeting the element equals 
a “fit”? Ten on a one-to-ten scale? Five on that same scale? 
What happens if the profile calls for services a child does not 
need?16 A parallel question is what it means to be a unique, 
“unusual” case that is exempt from the rule.17 How unusual is 
unusual enough? Will parents be able to challenge the good-
ness of fit between their child and the rule’s profile? The focus 
on the “unusual” exception runs contrary to the very nature of 
 
legal gamesmanship . . . in the litigation process, primarily by wealthy parents, to escape the 
standardized group and remain within the individualized protections of the second group.”). 
 14.  Czapanskiy, supra note 5, at 2. 
 15.  See Zirkel, supra note 8, at 223 (“[D]oes Professor Czapanskiy mean that the com-
mon profiles align with the current [IDEA disability] categories or that, a la a Bell curve, they 
are somehow only the core, average area of each one?”). 
 16.  Valverde, supra note 8, at 241; Zirkel, supra note 8, at 223. 
 17.  Czapanskiy, supra note 5, at 3. 
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special education: “All special education students’ situations 
are unusual. In fact, that is why it is called special educa-
tion.”18 
A further difficulty involves the fact that this proposed 
rule-based approach — with its focus on sameness — does not 
contain a mechanism to account for other ways of difference.19 
Assume we have three students with autism who meet the 
three-prong profile in the hypothetical rule. Additionally, one 
is an English learner;20 another is gifted and twice-exceptional 
(a child who is both gifted and a child with a disability);21 
while another is at risk for educational failure because of 
childhood neglect.22 How does the rule-based approach ac-
count for these three different types of non-autism-related 
need? Will a parent be able to challenge, under the rule-
based model, the rule’s inability to address these non-special 
education needs? 
In addition to the concerns raised above, it is not clear 
how Czapanskiy’s proposal would deal with a situation in 
which a child meets more than one profile.23 Assume a child 
who meets the “autism profile” is also blind and meets a pro-
file for students who are blind. How will the two profiles work 
together, if at all? Is this an unusual case because the child 
 
 18.  Yell, supra note 8, at 249 (emphasis in original). 
 19.  For an outstanding article discussing the legal concept of difference, see Martha Mi-
now, When Difference Has Its Home: Group Homes for the Mentally Retarded, Equal Protec-
tion and Legal Treatment of Difference, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REV. 111 (1987). 
 20.  See, e.g., Amanda L. Sullivan, Disproportionality in Special Education Identification 
and Placement of English Language Learners, 77 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 317, 317 (2011). 
 21.  See, e.g., Letter to Delisle, 62 IDELR 240 (2013), available at 
https://www2.ed.gov/policy/speced/guid/idea/memosdcltrs/13-008520r-sc-delisle-
twiceexceptional.pdf; see generally Perry A. Zirkel, Legal Update of Gifted Education, 39 J. 
EDUC. GIFTED 315 (2016). 
 22.  KRISTEN KELLY ET AL., Advocating For Educational Success For Children In Fos-
ter Care, in CHILD WELFARE LAW AND PRACTICE: REPRESENTING CHILDREN, PARENTS, 
AND STATE AGENCIES IN ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND DEPENDENCY CASES 607 (Donald N. Du-
quette et al. eds., 3rd ed. 2016). 
 23.  Zirkel, supra note 8, at 223. 
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meets two profiles? Or is it common but uncontemplated, be-
cause the child meets two of “numerous”24 situations? 
Even children who have only the difference that the 
profile is designed to address will have different degrees of 
need.25 Assume we have three children with autism who fit 
the profile. One has greatest need in expressive communi-
cation; one has greatest need in receptive communication; 
and one has greatest need in social interactions. Will the 
potential rule be agile enough to address intra-profile var-
iation? 
Finally, it is unclear how the Czapanskiy proposal 
would handle a situation in which a child does not make 
progress in the rule-defined educational approach. Assume 
one of the children with autism who met the three prongs 
in the hypothetical profile. The child receives instruction 
as required by the rule, but the child does not make pro-
gress or makes less progress than expected. How much lack 
of progress, and for what duration, is required before offi-
cials determine that the child no longer meets the profile? 
It is reasonable to expect that all of the lack-of-progress 
challenges to specific IEPs26 will then be recast as challeng-
es to the rule’s appropriateness to an individual child, based 
on that individual child’s lack of progress. 
Schools already group students with similar goals 
and services in similar placements, and that process is 
fraught with the difficulty that Professor Czapanskiy iden-
tifies.27  For the reasons I have stated, moving that group-
ing one analytical step 
 
 24.  Czapanskiy, supra note 5, at 2. 
 25.  See Valverde, supra note 8, at 237; Yell, supra note 8, at 249–50. 
 26.  See, e.g., C. B. v. Special Sch. Dist. No. 1, 636 F.3d 981 (8th Cir. 2011) (case suc-
cessfully challenging a school district’s apparent failure to respond to a child’s lack of progress). 
 27.  Professor Valverde makes this point boldly: “Thus, the illegal practice of some 
school districts does not, in any way, justify the proposed rule.” Valverde, supra note 8, at 241. 
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earlier (at the “similar needs” stage, rather than the “similar 
services” stage) and codifying it by a rule-based system makes 
this grouping less precise and more likely to be tainted by the 
some of the same difficulties that appear to have prompted 
Professor Czapanskiy’s call for reform in the first place, such as 
a lack of responsiveness to parental concerns and a lack of fo-
cus on evidence.28 
 
B.Individualization is an Educational Practice with Demon-
strated Efficacy. 
 
W h i l e  I sympathize with Professor Czapanskiy’s cri-
tique of the hidden sameness of special education programs, 
hidden from public view under a FERPA29 invisibility cloak,30 
the solution she proposes (in effect taking hidden sameness and 
making that sameness public) assumes that individualization is 
not necessary for many children with disabilities to receive spe-
cial education benefit.  As noted later in this section, this down-
play of the value of individualization runs against the education 
and social science literature.  While it is true that children with 
disabilities with similar needs are likely to learn with similar in-
structional methods,31 this is a matter of flexible likelihoods that 
is not amenable to reification by a rule for several reasons. 
First, individualization is an effective educational ap-
proach for children with disabilities.32  While certain broad 
 
 28.  For other discussions of the implementation problems posed by Czapanskiy’s pro-
posal, see Valverde, supra note 8, at 239–42; Yell, supra note 8, at 250–51; and Zirkel, supra 
note 8, at 222–24. 
 29.  Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (commonly abbrevi-
ated “FERPA”). 
 30.  Czapanskiy, supra note 5, at 2. 
 31.  Compare id. with JOHN L. HOSP ET AL., THE ABCS OF CURRICULUM-BASED 
EVALUATION: A PRACTICAL GUIDE TO EFFECTIVE DECISION-MAKING 148 (2014) (defining 
“individualized instruction,” including small group instruction where teaching is “specifically 
tailored” to each group member’s needs). 
 32.  See, e.g., JOHN HATTIE, VISIBLE LEARNING FOR TEACHERS; MAXIMIZING 
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instructional approaches and strategies are effective for chil-
dren with disabilities,33 each approach requires individualiza-
tion and nuance in application.34  Individualization is a basic, 
well-established, and documented tenet of special education 
practice, not a legal hoop to jump through or avoided by the 
adoption of a one-size-fits-most rule. 
Second, taking a general likelihood and establishing 
it as a rule runs the risk of falling into aptitude-by-
treatment-interaction35 quicksand. Ysseldyke and Marston 
elaborate: 
 
It is assumed that individual differences 
among members of the disability catego-
ry are directly linked to the extent to 
which they profit from different kinds of 
instruction. Or, it is assumed that there 
are specific instructional strategies or 
tactics that work uniquely with members 
of specific disability categories; that is, 
that performance on aptitude measures 
 
IMPACT ON LEARNING, 235 (2012) (showing that individualized special education in reading 
has a high effect size (0.43)).  In contrast, “ability grouping” has a very low effect size (0.12).  Id. 
at 206-07, 253. 
 33.  Id. at 251 (showing that “comprehensive interventions for learning disabled stu-
dents” have a very high effect size (0.77)); see also Jim Ysseldyke & Doug Marston, Origins of 
Categorical Special Education Services in Schools and a Rationale for Changing Them, in 
SPECIAL EDUCATION IN TRANSITION: FUNCTIONAL ASSESSMENT AND NONCATEGORICAL 
PROGRAMMING 1, 6 (Daniel J. Reschly et al., eds. 1999). 
 34.  See Yell, supra note 8, at 249–50; see also Susan Stainback & William Stainback, 
Changes Needed to Strengthen Regular Education, in ALTERNATIVE EDUCATIONAL 
DELIVERY SYSTEMS: ENHANCING INSTRUCTIONAL OPTIONS FOR ALL STUDENTS 17, 23–
24 (Janet L. Graden et al., eds. 1988). 
 35.  See, e.g., Daniel J. Reschly & W. David Tilly III, Reform Trends and System De-
sign Alternatives, in SPECAL EDUCATION IN TRANSITION: FUNCTIONAL ASSESSMENT AND 
NONCATEGORICAL PROGRAMMING 19, 20–21 (Daniel J. Reschly et al., eds. 1999); James E. 
Ysseldyke & Sandra L. Christenson, Linking Assessment to Intervention, in ALTERNATIVE 
EDUCATIONAL DELIVERY SYSTEMS: ENHANCING INSTRUCTIONAL OPTIONS FOR ALL 
STUDENTS 91, 94 (Janet L. Graden et al., eds. 1988). 
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interacts with treatments to produce dif-
ferent kinds of outcomes (Aptitude x 
treatment interactions — ATIs).36 
 
While noting that instructional strategies and approaches 
work across disability categories and among children who are 
IDEA-eligible, and noting that different instructional strate-
gies work when teaching specific content and skills, Ysseldyke 
and Marston conclude that there “are few, if any, aptitude by 
treatment interactions.”37 For this reason, the research shows 
that ATI has low effectiveness,38 to the point of being de-
scribed as a “failure.”39 A rule premised on the assumption 
that all children with Attribute X need Instructional Ap-
proach Y risks low effectiveness because it glosses over the 
possibilities that (1) the Instructional Approach Y may help 
children with other attributes and (2) children with Attribute 
X may also benefit from Instructional Approach Z. Professor 
Czapanskiy’s rule-based approach must be sufficiently nimble 
to step around the ATI trap. Experts like Yell doubt that it 
could be: “Even if Czapanskiy’s assertion that many students 
share a common profile were true, there is no evidence that 
such a profile can be matched by educators to the interven-
tions and programs that they use with their students.”40 
 
C. A Rules-Based Approach Will Be Effective Only If 
It Focuses on Causes, Not Solely on Effects. 
 
While Professor Czapanskiy is wise to point out the 
crucial role of a “careful assessment” in determining whether 
 
 36.  Ysseldyke & Marston, supra note 33, at 6. 
 37.  Id.  The exception they note is for children with sensory impairments. Id 
 38.  See, e.g., HATTIE, supra note 32, at 234, 253 (effect size of 0.19). 
 39.  Reschly & Tilly, supra note 35, at 20. 
 40.  Yell, supra note 8, at 250. 
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a child meets the rule and preserving to parents their right to 
challenge assessment methods and results,41  her proposal 
does not address one of the most important problems that con-
front any attempt at providing special education services — 
the temptation to focus solely on how students are not meet-
ing standards without also focusing on why students are not 
meeting standards.42 If the root cause is not addressed, the 
child’s progress toward meeting standards can be frustrated by 
adult action just as much as by inaction.43 This happens be-
cause placing a child in an environment that would otherwise 
be a good fit for the child (by focusing on the ways the child 
meets the rule), while allowing needs or threats to remain 
unaddressed (by ignoring needs not addressed by the rule), 
presents an ongoing risk to the child.44 In fact, instructional 
strategies that do not attend to root causes for the child’s lack 
of performance may make performance worse.45 Thus, any 
rules-based approach must be grounded in evaluations that 
are nuanced and address root causes. Otherwise, the instruc-
tion provided will address only surface-level needs, and in a 
superficial way. 
As an example, consider two children who fidget at their 
desks and do not pay attention to their classwork, staring re-
 
 41.  Czapanskiy, supra note 5, at 2–3. 
 42.  See, e.g., Lee Kern & Glen Dunlap, Developing Effective Program Plans for Stu-
dents with Disabilities, in SPECIAL EDUCATION IN TRANSITION: FUNCTIONAL ASSESSMENT 
AND NONCATEGORICAL PROGRAMMING 213, 214 (Daniel J. Reschly et al., eds. 1999). 
 43.  This may be one reason why aptitude by treatment interaction has not shown prom-
ise. See generally supra notes 36–41.  Similar children may have similar aptitudes, but different 
root causes for their aptitudes. A surface-level approach to their aptitudes common aptitudes 
may gloss over real differences in instructional need. See infra notes 46-47 and accompanying 
text. 
 44.  Cf. Thomas A. Mayes, Understanding Intersectionality between the Law, Gender, 
Sexuality, and Children, 36 CHILD. LEG. RTS. J. 90, 104 (2016) (placing an LGBTQ child in 
foster care in a heterosexist — but otherwise suitable — setting “is likely to further harm the 
child”). 
 45.  See, e.g., B.H. v. W. Clermont Bd. of Educ., 788 F. Supp. 2d 682, 697-99 (S.D. 
Ohio 2011) (mismatch between child and intervention led to “escalating behaviors” and un-
successful plans). 
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peatedly around the room. One has attention deficit hyperac-
tivity disorder (ADHD), and one has post-traumatic stress dis-
order (PTSD). On the surface, the two children exhibit similar 
behaviors; however, the root causes for their behavior could not 
be more different.46 The child with ADHD cannot sustain at-
tention; on the other hand, the child with PTSD is hyper-
vigilant.47  The child with PTSD is trying to pay attention to 
everything all at once. Applying an instructional approach to 
the child with PTSD to help her “pay attention,” an approach 
that may be successful for a child with ADHD, will be counter-
productive.  If the child with PTSD is placed in programming 
because the child met the rule-based “ADHD profile,” at best 
the child’s instruction will be ineffective.  At worst, the child 
will be harmed. 
 
D . Rules-Based Approaches Run the Risk of Essentialism 
 
A rules-based approach runs the risk of being reductionist. 
Without robust protections and continual vigilance, the possibil-
ity exists of an insidious drift toward essentialism: once I know 
an attribute about you, that knowledge is all I need to know 
about you.48 The child moves from fitting the profile to being 
 
 46.  See, e.g., Steven P. Cuffe et al., Comorbidity of Attention Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, 3 J. CHILD & FAM. STUD. 327 (1994); Julian D. 
Ford et al., Child Maltreatment, Other Trauma Exposure, and Posttraumatic Symptomatology 
Among Children with Oppositional Defiant and Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorders, 5 
CHILD MALTREATMENT 205 (2000); Dan Weinstein et al., Attention-Deficit Hyperactivity 
Disorder and Posttraumatic Stress Disorder: Differential Diagnosis in Childhood Sexual Abuse, 
20 CLINICAL PSYCHOL. R. 359 (2000). 
 47.  See the sources cited in note 46 for the similarities and distinctions between ADHD 
and PTSD. 
 48.  Valverde, supra note 8, at 236–37 (citations omitted).  For discussion of essentialism 
in other contexts, see, e.g., Patricia A. Cain, Lesbian Perspective, Lesbian Experience, and the 
Risk of Essentialism, 2 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 43 (1994); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essential-
ism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581 (1990); Adrien Katherine Wing, Brief Re-
flections toward a Multiplicative Theory and Praxis of Being, 6 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L.J. 181 
(1990). 
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defined by the profile.49 The child is no longer described by the 
profile: the child and the profile have collapsed together into a 
totality. 
Professor Valverde’s critique of the proposed rule-
based system identifies its essentialist character: 
 
Instead, she engaged in disability pro-
filing by naming children on the autism 
spectrum as one example of students 
with the same “profile.” Through this 
baseless assumption, Czapanskiy strips 
individual children of their unique abil-
ities, challenges, resources, and envi-
ronments; she reduces them to little 
more than their disability diagnosis or 
category without any discussion, let 
alone acknowledgement, of the fact that 
disabilities vary widely in the ways in 
which they manifest and affect people.50 
 
The motive for engaging in essentialism is clear: essential-
ism, or “disability profiling,”51 is “easy” and emotionally 
safe52 to the profiler. Once the child becomes the profile, the 
role of the adults and the environment may be ignored or ex-
cused.53 The child has needs because the child “meets” an 
external profile, rather than the child’s teachers have been 
providing instruction lacking evidentiary support.  Essential-
 
 49.  See Ysseldyke & Marston, supra note 33, at 8. 
 50.  Valverde, supra note 8, at 236–37 (citations omitted). 
 51.  Id. at 236. 
 52.  Harris, supra note 48, at 605. 
 53.   Compare assessment practices that focus solely on the learner and not the relation-
ship of the learner to the instructor, the material, or the environment. Ysseldyke & Marston, 
supra note 33, at 8–9. 
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ism simultaneously “helps to organize experience” while 
“denying some of it.”54 This easy path leads to incomplete 
knowledge and thereby limits the likely success of rule-based 
systems that assume an essentialist character. 
 
E .  Walking Back from Individualization Runs Coun-
ter to Other Pertinent Laws. 
 
Rolling back the legal obligation (whether or not it is 
currently implemented in practice) for IEP Teams to indi-
vidualize for each child runs against the prevailing legal 
winds. For that reason, any change to IDEA that would al-
low for rule-based decision-making risks running counter to 
IDEA’s civil rights roots, as described below. 
First, individualization is a hallmark of federal statutes 
protecting the civil rights 
 
of persons with disabilities. The Americans with Disabilities 
Act (“ADA”)55 and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973 (“Section 504”)56 embody a requirement of employers, 
state and local governments, and public places to make reason-
able accommodations to disabled persons.57 The notion of a 
reasonable accommodation is context based, founded on indi-
vidual need in the particular circumstances.58 For example, 
what a reasonable accommodation is in the employment con-
text will depend on the interaction between the essential func-
 
 54.  Martha Minow, Feminist Reason: Getting It and Losing It, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 47, 
51 (1988), quoted in Harris, supra note 48, at 607. 
 55.  42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213. 
 56.  29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.  Section 504 and the ADA provide largely overlapping cov-
erage and protections to public school students with disabilities.  See, e.g., PERRY A. ZIRKEL, 
SECTION 504, THE ADA, AND THE SCHOOLS (3d ed. 2013). 
 57.  See supra notes 55-56. 
 58.  See generally supra notes 55-56. 
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tions of the position, the employee’s disability, and the em-
ployer’s resources, a very individualized calculation.59  
Additionally, in the elementary and secondary educa-
tion context, IDEA is not the only statute that governs. Sec-
tion 504 and the ADA do, as well,60 and may impose obliga-
tions beyond the IDEA.61 Section 504 regulations require 
public schools “to meet individual educational needs of” chil-
dren with disabilities “as adequately as the needs of [children 
without disabilities] are met.”62 Could a rule-based means of 
delivering IDEA services run afoul of Section 504’s adequacy 
requirement, a requirement that contains an individualization 
element?63 If it does, then compliance with the IDEA will be 
no defense.64 
Finally, individualization is a hallmark of juvenile and 
family law.65  Just as formulaic special education would do a 
disservice to children, families, and educators, so would 
cookie-cutter custody orders or visitation schedules. Addi-
tionally, for children in state care because of abuse or ne-
glect, the law requires services to be child-specific-services 
that the child needs to be safe and have a permanent home, 
not services that the child welfare agency has readily availa-
ble.66  “The whole child, not simply the facets of the child’s 
 
 59.  See LAURA ROTHSTEIN & JULIA IRZYK, DISABILITIES AND THE LAW (4th ed. 
2016) at § 4:20. 
 60.  See id. at §§ 2:53 through 2:55. 
 61.  See generally K.M. v. Tustin Unified Sch. Dist., 725 F.3d 1088 (9th Cir. 2013) (rec-
ognizing that Title II of the ADA may impose a requirement to provide more services than 
would be required by the IDEA). 
 62.  34 C.F.R. § 104.33(b)(1) (emphasis added). 
 63.  For a comparison of the substantive standards under the IDEA and Section 504, see 
Perry A. Zirkel, The Substantive Standard for FAPE: Does Section 504 Require Less Than the 
IDEA?, 5 WEST’S EDUC. L.Q. 369 (1996). 
 64.  See generally K.M., 725 F.3d 1088 (IDEA compliance is no defense when the ADA 
imposes a higher standard). 
 65.  Like Professor Czapanskiy, I have a background in children and the law. Compare 
supra note * (my background) with Zirkel, supra note 8, at 225 & n.46 (Professor Czapanskiy’s 
background). 
 66.  VIVEK S. SANKARAN, Representing Parents in Child Welfare Cases, in CHILD 
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life that are easily addressed, is entitled to reasonable efforts 
toward reunification and to timely permanency.”67  A similar 
logic set would apply to children with disabilities: all of their 
needs must be addressed, not merely the needs that adults 
know how to address. 
 
F. The Harms Professor Czapanskiy Hopes to Ad-
dress with a Rules-based Delivery System are 
Worthy of Attention. 
 
Like others who have reviewed her proposal,68 I agree 
with Professor Czapanskiy’s identification of the problems 
with special education in America. We see a lack of evidence-
based instruction, a persistent achievement gap, a system that 
is in many places inhospitable to — and impenetrable by — 
parents and that parents do not trust, and a system that is in-
sulated from public scrutiny by FERPA.69 This bleak picture 
compels a response; however, the response must be something 
with a reasonable chance of success. For the reasons I have 
explained above, I have serious reservations about whether a 
rule-based system is the appropriate solution to the serious 
problems presented. 
Rather than abandoning individualization in favor of a 
rule, might it not be more helpful to provide support for 
schools to improve special education practice? For example, 
schools that accelerate the growth of children with disabilities 
may serve as models to schools where the achievement gap is 
not declining. Other schools could learn from the experience 
 
WELFARE LAW AND PRACTICE: REPRESENTING CHILDREN, PARENTS, AND STATE 
AGENCIES IN ABUSE, NEGLECT, AND DEPENDENCY CASES 767, 791 (Donald N. Duquette et 
al. eds., 3rd ed. 2016) (“They should consider all the programs available in the county – not 
those typically used by the [child welfare] agency.”). 
 67.  Mayes, supra note 44, at 105. 
 68.  See supra note 8. 
 69.  Czapanskiy, supra note 5, at 2. 
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of these high-performing, high-growth schools, through ob-
servation of teaching in action or through dissemination of re-
sources — including resource banks, decision-making 
flowcharts, and de-identified special-education documents that 
resulted in notable progress for specific students with specific 
special education needs.70 As an additional example, school 
leaders can provide coaching and oversight to special-
education professionals – techniques already at their disposal – 
to ensure that IEPs are individualized, evidence-based, and 
implemented.71 
 
III.CONCLUSION 
 
I appreciate Professor Czapanskiy’s bold vision.  In my opinion, 
her focus is on the things that matter. She challenges aspects of 
the status quo that deserve attention. However, I fear that Pro-
fessor Czapanskiy’s proposal, were it to be adopted, would not 
make things better.  Perhaps she, or other proponents of such a 
rule-based system, will be willing to address my concerns, sever-
al of which others hold,72 by providing additional explanations 
or modifications to this proposal in their future scholarship. 
Perhaps proponents of a rule-based system will be able to show 
that my concerns are misplaced or alarmist. In any event, I look 
forward to further dialogue about this bold vision and a com-
mon effort to improve special education services and outcomes 
in the United States. 
 
 
 70.  See Rubin, supra note 8, at 232–33 (urging the development of a “repertoire of 
state-supported ‘best practices,’”).  For information on scaling and implementation of school 
improvement activities, see Dean Fixsen et al., Statewide Implementation of Evidence-Based 
Programs, 79 EXCEPTIONAL CHILD. 213 (2013). 
 71.  See e.g., Thomas A. Mayes, Special Education for School Leaders: An Organization-
al Self-Assessment Framework, Presentation at the School Administrators of Iowa School Law 
Conference, Feb. 9, 2016. 
 72.  See supra note 8. 
